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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This is an appeal from a final judgment issued by the District Court. 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction under 78A-3-l 02 U.C.A. The case 
was transferred from the Utah Supreme Court to the Utah Court of Appeals 
under 78A-4-103(2)G). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. A. Issue: Did the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
of the District Court improperly rely on hearsay statements. 
B. Standard of review: In reviewing hearsay rulings, the 
appellate courts review legal questions for correctness, factual questions for 
clear error, and the final ruling on admissibility for abuse of discretion. State 
v. Workman, 2005 UT 66, ,r 10, 122 P.3d 639; 
C. Trial Preservation: 
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Plaintiffs objected to the hearsay statements of the accounts, IRS and 
Utah Tax Commission. See record 1541 page 49-54. Plaintiffs objected to 
statements attributed to Ellen Ha. 1538 page 135, 139-40. Plaintiffs 
objected to documents purportedly created and signed by Lavina Ha. 1539 
pages 48-50. Plaintiffs objected to the introduction of the Redemption 
Agreement. Plaintiffs also objected because Lavina Ha never testified to 
owning any stock in the Corporation. 15 3 9 pages 111-11 7. Plaintiffs 
objected to out of court statements purportedly made by Lavina Ha 
regarding her interest in shares.' 1541 pages 38-39. 
2. A. Issue: Was there insufficient evidence to support the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Order and Judgment regarding the 
distribution of shares among the shareholders? 
B. Standard of review: The appellate court will reverse only if, 
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, the 
evidence is insufficient to support the verdict. Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch.. 
817 P.2d 789, 799 (Utah 1991). 
C. Trial Preservation: Plaintiffs presented evidence and 
contested the Defendants evidence throughout the trial. Plaintiffs argued as 
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to insufficient evidence to support the Defendants case at closing. 1543 
pages 14-36. 
3. A. Issue: Did the District Court improperly allow Coung 
Trang to assert the interests of Lavinia Ha as a stockholder in the 
Corporation. 
B. Standard of review: The appellate court accords no 
deference to the district court's conclusions of law, including its 
interpretation of precedent and statute as applied to the case. Torian v. 
Craig. 2012 UT 63, ~ 13,289 P.3d 479 
C. Trial Preservation: Plaintiffs objected to the introduction 
of the Redemption Agreement. Plaintiffs also objected because Lavina Ha 
never asserted an interest in any stock in the Corporation. 1539 pages 111-
117. 
4. A. Issue: Was the Plaintiffs demand for a special 
stockholders meeting proper? 
B. Standard of review: The appellate court accords no 
deference to the district court's conclusions of law, including its 
interpretation of precedent and statute as applied to the case. Torian v. 
Craig, 2012 UT 63,, 13, 289 P.3d 479 
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C. Trial Preservation: Plaintiff presented evidence of the 
request. 1537 pages 70-72, Exhibit Pl 8. 
5. A. Issue: Did the Court improperly award mediation costs 
under Rule 54? 
B. Standard of review: Under Rule 54( d), Utah Courts 
define costs as witness fees, travel expenses, and service of process 
expenses, but "only in accordance with the fee schedule set by statute." 
Morgan v. Morgan, 795 P.2d 684,687 (Utah Ct.App.1990) Trial courts 
abuse their discretion when they award costs outside of these limitations. 
Long v. Stutesman, 2011 UT App 438,269 P.3d 178 (Utah Ct. App. 2011). 
C. Trial Preservation: Plaintiffs objected to the inclusion of 
mediation costs, See Plaintiffs' Memorandum Objection to Costs. Docket 
No. 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
There are no Constitutional Provisions. 
Statutory Provision: 
16-l0a-702. Special meeting. 
(I) A corporation shall hold a special meeting of shareholders: 
(a) on call of its board of directors or the person or persons authorized 
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by the bylaws to call a special meeting; or 
(b) if the holders of shares representing at least 10% of all the votes 
entitled to be cast on any issue proposed to be c_onsidered at the 
proposed special meeting sign, date, and deliver to the corporation's 
secretary one or more written demands for the meeting, stating the 
purpose or purposes for which it is to be held. 
(2) If not otherwise fixed under Sections 16-1 0a-703 or 16-1 0a-707, the 
record date for determining shareholders entitled to demand a special 
meeting pursuant to Subsection (l)(b) is the earliest date of any of the 
demands pursuant to which the meeting is called or the date that is 60 
days prior to the date the first of the written demands pursuant to which 
the meeting is called is received by the corporation, whichever is later. 
(3) Special shareholders' meetings may be held in or out of this state at the 
place stated in or fixed in accordance with the bylaws. If no place is 
stated or fixed in accordance with the bylaws, special meetings shall be 
held at the corporation's principal office. 
( 4) Only business within the purpose or purposes described in the meeting 
notice required by Subsection 16-1 0a-705(3) may be conducted at a 
special shareholders' meeting, unless notice of the meeting is waived by 
all shareholders pursuant to Section 16-1 0a-706. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Nature of the Case: This is a contentious dispute regarding the 
ownership and ultimate control over a corporation. The Plaintiffs, who own 
a majority of the shares within the Corporation, requested that the minority 
shareholder and director of the Corporation call a shareholders' meeting. 
The Plaintiffs requests were denied. 
Proceedings: Plaintiffs instituted this lawsuit on May 27, 2011. 
Plaintiffs claimed the following divisions of the shares of the Corporation: 1) 
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Cuong Si Trang- 65,000 shares; 2) Muoi To Ha - 40,000 shares; 3) Weiman 
Ha - 35,70_0 shares; Olivia Bae Ha - 5,000 shares. On August 5,6,7,8 and 
September 3, 4, 5, 2013 the Court held a bench trial. On November 4, 2013, 
Judge Chon issued a Findings of Pact and Conclusions of Law, Order and 
Judgment. The Order and Judgment determined the shares as follows: 1) 
Cuong Si Trang- 65,000 shares; 2) Muoi To Ha - 40,000 shares; 3) Weiman 
Ha - 15,700 shares; Olivia Bae Ha - 5,000 shares. On November 13, 2013, 
the Defendants filed a Memorandum of Costs. On November 19, 2013, 
Plaintiffs filed an objection to costs. Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Appeal on 
December 2, 2013, appealing the November 4, 2013 Order and Judgment. 
On January 7, 2014, the Court of Appeals issued a Sua Sponte Motion for 
Summary Judgment because the November 4, 2013 Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, Order and Judgment lacked specific language stating 
that it was a final order. On January 14, 2014 Plaintiffs filed a Motion for 
Clarification or Certification with the Trial Court. Plaintiffs requested that 
the Trial Court clarify whether the November 4 Order and Judgment was 
intended as a Final Judgment for the pUipose of appeal. Defendants filed a 
Response Memorandum on January 29, 2014. Plaintiffs filed a Reply 
Memorandum and a Request to Submit on February 3, 2014. On March 5, 
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2014, the Court of Appeals ordered the Plaintiffs' initial appeal dismissed 
for lack of a final appealable order. On March 6, 2014, the Trial Court 
issued a Memorandum Decision on Costs, and Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Clarification and Stay. The March 6, 2014 Memorandum Decision stated 
that it was the Trial Court's intention that the November 4, 2013 Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law, Order and Judgment were the final order of 
the Court and that no further orders were necessary. The Memorandum 
Decision also awarded the Defendants costs associated with the parties' 
mediation. Plaintiffs filed their second Notice of Appeal on March 28, 2014. 
The appeal was transferred from the Utah Supreme Court to the Utah Court 
of Appeals on May 8, 2014. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Cuong Trang testified that he purchased a supermarket in 1997 
with an $85,000.00 down payment. 1538 page 124. 
2. Cuong Trang testified that the money for the down payment 
came from his personal funds and money that he borrowed from relatives. 
1538 page 124 and 1539 page 137. 
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3. Cuong Trang testified that none of the money used for the down 
payment came from any of the Has. 1538 page 124. 
4. Cuong Trang then used money invested by Muoi Ha and Olivia 
Ha to pay off the loans he received from family members. 1539 page 137-
39. 
5. Cuong Trang testified that Lavina Ha gave him money for the 
market. 1538 page 134-35. 
6. Cuong Trang testified that Weiman Ha gave him no money. 
1538 page 134-35. 
7. Olivia Ha testified that Weiman Ha gave money for the market 
but that she did not know the amount. 1538 page 54. 
8. Cuong Trang testified that he incorporated the market on the 
advice of Ellen Ha based on the suggestion of Weiman Ha. 1538 page 135 
and 137. 
9. Cuong Trang testified that Lavina Ha, Muoi Ha and Ollvia Ha 
were involved in the discussions to incorporate. 1538 page 138. 
10. The Plaintiffs testified that Weiman Ha, Muoi Ha and Olivia Ha 
and Cuong Trang incorporated Southeast Supermarket on March 24, 1999. 
1537 page 48-49, 1538 pages 54-59 
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11. Muoi Ha testified that Lavina Ha had no shares in the 
Corporation. 1537 page 90. 
12. At the time of incorporation, the Corporation was authorized to 
issue 145,700 shares of common stock. 1538 page 140 Exhibit D2 
13. The Plaintiffs and Defendant Cuong Trang each signed an IRS 
form 2553 allocating the shares of the Corporation as follows: 
A. Cuong Si Trang - 65,000 shares. 1538 page 110 
B. Muoi To Ha - 40,000 shares. 1537 page 49 
C. Weiman Ha - 35,700 shares. Weiman Ha 1540 pages 52-
53 
D. Olivia Bae Ha- 5,000 shares 1538 page 55 
14. The evidence was contradictory as to whether IRS form 2553 
was filed with the IRS. Cuong Trang and Sylvia Trang stated that it had not 
been filed with the IRS. (Coung Trang 1538 page 1 l0)(Sylvia Trang 1541 
page 125). However Sylvia Trang testified that IRS form 2553 was filed 
with the IRS when the Corporation filed its taxes in 2009. 1541 page 141. 
15. The original Directors of the Corporation were Defendant 
Cuong Trang and Plaintiff Weiman Ha. 1538 page 139. 
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16. In May, 2004 Weiman Ha suffered a stroke. Sylvia Trang 
described his subsequent behavior as erratic, delusional, paranoid, angry, 
with a loss of memory. 1541 pages 48-49. 
17. Cuong Trang testified that he removed Weiman Ha as a director 
of the Corporation on December 10, 2004 because Olivia Ha discovered that 
Weiman Ha was writing checks for business expenses for a restaurant that 
Weiman Ha owned. See Exhibit D8, D9, D10. 1539 pages 42-47. Cuong 
Trang also testified that he revoked Weiman Ha's ability to write checks on 
the Corporate account. 1538 page 44, Exhibit D6 
18. Olivia Ha testified that she did not have any conversations with 
Cuong Trang regarding Weiman Ha writing checks on the Corporate 
account. 1538 pages 24-26, 60-62 
19. Weiman Ha testified that he was never told that he had been 
removed as a director of the Corporation. Weiman testified that he heard 
rumors that he had been removed. 1540 pages 63-64 
20. The evidence also showed that Weiman Ha continued to write 
checks on the Corporate account after December 10, 2004. D33 SM000153-
55. 
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21. Defendant Cuong Trang testified that he sent notice to all of the 
shareholders notifying them that Weiman Ha had been removed as a 
director. 1539 page 44. 
22. Plaintiff Muoi Ha testified that she did not know that Weiman 
Ha had been removed as a director of the Corporation. 1537 pages 100-01. 
23. In July 2007, Plaintiff Muoi Ha was locked out of the 
Corporation by Defendant Cuong Trang. 1537 page 104. 
24. Cuong Trang and Sylvia Trang testified that Muoi Ha was 
removed from the operation of the Corporation for stealing around 
September 27, 2007. 1539 pages 53-55, Exhibit D12. 1541 page 86. 
25. In October and November of 2009, the Corporation filed tax 
returns with the IRS for the years 2005, 2006, 2007 and 2008. Exhibit D34. 
26. Defendant Sylvia Trang testified that she used Exhibit P 1 as the 
basis for determining the shareholders in the Corporation when the taxes 
were filed in 2009. 1541 page 13 9. 
27. Defendant Coung Trang and Defendant Sylvia Trang testified 
that Weiman Ha remained responsible for all of the Corporation's tax 
records, sales records, and filings after he was accused of stealing from the 
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Corporation and subsequently removed as a Director of the Corporation on 
December 10, 2004. 1539 pages 51-52 
28. The amended tax returns for 2005-08 listed the shareholders of 
the Corporation as follows: 
A. Cuong Si Trang - 44.61 % of common stock 
B. Olivia Bae Ha- 3.44% of common stock 
C. Weiman Ha - 24.50% of common stock 
D. Muoi To Ha-27.45% of common stock 
29. The stock ownership listed in the 2005-08 tax returns based on 
145,700 shares of outstanding common stock breaks down to: 
A. Cuong Si Trang - 65,000 shares 
B. Olivia Bae Ha - 5,000 shares 
C . Weiman Ha - 35,700 shares 
D. Muoi To Ha - 40,000 shares 
30. Defendant Cuong Trang admitted that the Corporation did not 
issue or transfer any stocks between the time that the tax returns in Exhibit 
D34 were filed and the start of the litigation. 1540 page 31. 
31. On February 26, 2010, Plaintiff Weiman Ha, as a director and 
shareholder of Southeast Supermarket, requested that a special shareholders 
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meeting and a board of directors meeting be convened. Exhibits P 11 and 
Pl2. 
32. During the discovery period and at trial, the Defendants 
produced Defendants' Exhibits D6 and D 11. 
33. Exhibit D6 is a revocable proxy for 4215 1 shares of the 
Corporation. 
34. Exhibit D11 is a revocation of the proxy of Exhibit D6 
35. Exhibits D6 and D11 were purportedly signed by Lavina Ha. 
See Exhibits D6 and D 11. 
36. Exhibit D6 states that the document was signed on March 23, 
1999. See Exhibit D6. 
37. Exhibit D11 states that the document was signed on December 
10, 2004. See Exhibit D11. 
38. On August 7, 2013 Defendant Cuong Trang testified that D6 
was prepared by Lavina Ha while she lived in California and then mailed to 
Defendant Cuong Trang. 1539 pages 37-38. 
1 Although the body of the text indicates that the proxy is for 4215 shares, 
the securities information at the bottom of the document indicates that it is 
for 4390 shares. The revocation of the proxy also indicates 4390 shares. 
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3 9. Defendant Cuong Trang testified that D 11 was prepared by 
Lavina Ha while she lived in California and then mailed to Defendant Cuong 
Trang. 1539 pages 48-50. 
40. Sylvia Trang testified that she originally created D 11 in 2004. 
1541 page 131-32. 
41. On August 8, 2013, Counsel for the Plaintiffs alerted the Court 
to a possible fraud that was being perpetuated on the Court. Plaintiffs 
obtained evidence that showed that Defendant Sylvia Trang created Exhibits 
D6 and Dl 1 on March 7, 2010. 1538 pages 4-12. 
42. On September 3, 2013, Sylvia Trang admitted that she created 
these documents in March, 2010 and e-mailed them to Lavina Ha with a 
request that Lavina Ha sign and return them to her. 1542 pages 55, 1540 
page 129-35. 
43. Defendant Sylvia Trang explained that she could not locate the 
originals of these documents however she was able to locate the original 
computer generated documents because it was located at her home in Utah. 
She also stated that the old computer generated documents could not be e-
mailed or printed or otherwise tr_ansferred from the computer that they were 
on. Therefore, she recreated the documents on a different computer, line by 
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line, and then sent the recreated documents to Lavina Ha. Defendant Sylvia 
Trang testified that Ellen Ha originally created these documents. 1541 pages 
129-30. 
44. Defendant Sylvia Trang then disposed of the old computer by 
donating it to DI later that year. 1541 page 131. 
45. Defendant Sylvia Trang admitted that the Defendants provided 
Exhibits D6 and D 11 to the Court at trial without notifying the Court or the 
Plaintiffs that the documents were actually recreations, rather than copies of 
the originals. 1542 page 55. 
46. On March 8, 2010, Defendant Sylvia Trang changed the 
registered principals of the Corporation with the State of Utah. Defendant 
Sylvia Trang removed Plaintiff Weiman Ha as a Director. Defendant Sylvia 
Trang added herself as Secretary for the Corporation. Exhibit P 13. 
47. On March 11, 2010, Defendant Cuong Trang repudiated 
Plaintiff Weiman Ha's call for a special shareholder's meeting. The letter 
sent by Defendant Cuong Trang's Attorney stated that no shareholder's 
meeting could be conducted because the Corporation was unable to identify 
and verify the shareholders of the Corporation. The letter blamed Plaintiff 
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Weiman Ha for taking the stock certificates and books of the Corporation. 
Exhibit Pl 4. 
48. On April 11, 2011, Plaintiffs Weiman Ha, Muoi Ha and Olivia 
Ha sent certified letters to Defendant Cuong Trang and Defendant Sylvia 
Trang demanding that a special shareholder's meeting be called. Exhibit 
Pl5. 
49. On April 25, 2011, Olivia Ha was fired. 1541 pages 164-65. 
50. On April 26, 2011, Sylvia Trang sent an e-mail to employees of 
the Cmporation stating that Olivia Ha was fired for theft. Exhibit Pl 7. 
51. On April 26, 2011, Sylvia Trang filed for an ex parte domestic 
relations protective order against Olivia Ha. 1541 page 167. 
52. On May 16, 2011 at the 10:00 a.m. calendar, the Court 
dismissed the Protective Order issued against Olivia Ha. 1541 pages 167-
69. 
53. After the dismissal of the Protective Order on May 16, 2011, 
Counsel for Cuong Trang e-mailed a letter whereby Defendant Cuong Trang 
again refused to convene a special shareholders meeting. The response letter 
by Defendant Cuong Trang's attorney stated: 
No books and records of the Company have been returned, and 
none of your clients has provided any certificates showing their 
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stock ownership that can be verified as authentic. Mr. Trang 
cannot, and will not, consider any request for a special meeting 
of shareholders until Weiman Ha, Muoi Ha, and Olivia Ha 
return corporate minute book and all other Company records 
unlawfully in their possession, and they provide copies of their 
stock certificates so that Mr. Trang can make a preliminary 
evaluation of authenticity. (Plaintiffs Exhibit 18). 
54. At trial, Defendant Sylvia Trang testified that the stock 
certificates and minute books were still missing. 1538 page 80. 
55. Defendant Sylvia Trang also testified that no Corporate 
Minutes were sent to the Stockholders. 1538 page 172. 
56. Defendant Sylvia Trang testified that she saw the physical stock 
certificate that were issued by the Corporation in 1999. 1541 page 17 6-77. 
57. Defendant Cuong Trang admitted at trial that the Corporation 
never issued physical stock certificates, but rather the stock was issued 
verbally. 1539 page 37, 140-01. 
58. Plaintiffs testified at trial that no stock certificates were issued. 
1537 page 50 
59. Defendant Coung Trang and Defendant Sylvia Trang presented 
evidence that Lavina Ha owned either 4,215, 4390, 15,700 or 20,000 shares. 
Exhibit D6, Exhibit DI 1, 1539 page 35. Defendant Cuong Trang testified 
that Lavina Ha gave Weiman Ha 15,700 of her shares. 1539 page 36. 
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60. At no point during the litigation, did Lavina Ha ever assert to 
the Court that she owned shares of the Corporation. Lavina Ha did not 
appear at trial nor was she deposed. 
61. There is no evidence on the record that Lavina Ha was ever 
identified as a shareholder on any tax records. 
62. When questioned about the accuracy of the tax returns, both 
Defendant Cuong Trang and Defendant Sylvia Trang pled the Fifth 
Amendment right against self-incrimination rather than respond to a 
question about the accuracy of the tax returns. 1540 page 41, 1542 page 70 
63. On July 17, 2013, Defendant Coung Trang, Defendant Sylvia 
Trang and their attorney, Michael Petrogeorge, met with Lavina Ha in 
California. 
64. At the July 17, 2013 meeting, the Defendants and Lavina Ha 
executed a Shareholder Interest Redemption Agreement purporting to buy 
back 20,000 shares owned by Lavina Ha. (Exhibit D19). 
65. The Redemption Agreement was executed without the 
knowledge or consent of any of the Plaintiffs. 
66. At trial, the Plaintiffs objected to the introduction of the 
Redemption Agreement as a document prepared for the litigation and not a 
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normal business record.2 Plaintiffs also objected because Lavina Ha never 
asserted any claims to stock in the litigation. 1539 pages· 111-117. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Plaintiffs have been seeking a determination of shareholders and 
requesting a shareholders meeting for over three (3) years. There was 
insufficient credible evidence to support the Trial Court's determination as 
to the composition of the shareholders. The Trial Court determined that the 
Plaintiffs lacked credibility throughout the trial to justify its final 
determination of the shareholders. To support this determination, the Trial 
Court created findings on issues that were irrelevant to the determination of 
who owned shares. The best evidence showing the shareholders of the 
Corporation at the time of incorporation was a document signed, by each of 
the Plaintiffs and Defendant Cuong Trang. The Defendants also relied on 
this document for the preparation of tax returns showing the shareholders of 
the Corporation. Rather, than rely on these basic corporate records, the Trial 
Court chose instead to rely on documents fabricated by the Defendants. The 
2 Although Plaintiffs did not specifically state their objection as a hearsay 
objection, it is clear from the record that the parties were arguing over the 
business record exception to hearsay statements. 
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record shows that it w~s Defendant Cuong Trang and Defendant Sylvia 
Trang who lacked credibility. The Trial Court abused its discretion in 
disregarding documents signed by the parties and filed with the government 
in favor of self- serving testimony of the Defendants and fabricated 
documents. The inconsistency in this evidence arose from inconsistent 
evidence and testimony presented by the Defendants, not the Plaintiffs. The 
Court repeatedly allowed the Defendants to rely on statements of Lavina Ha 
and Ellen Ha. Neither of these two potential witnesses testified at trial. The 
Trial Court allowed the Defendants to assert the interests of Lavina Ha 
without requiring the Defendants to bring her into this lawsuit. The Trial 
Court improperly awarded the Defendants costs associated with the parties' 
mediation. 
ARGUMENT 
1. The Court Improperly Relied on Hearsay Statements in its 
Findings 
The Trial Court repeatedly allowed Defendants Cuong Trang and 
Sylvia Trang to testify as to the out of court statements of other people. 
Although the Trial Judge, in a bench trial, is granted greater leniency 
regarding the admittance of out of court statements, the final findings of the 
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Trial Court should not have been based on the out-of-court statements when 
they go to the truth of the matter. 
Out-of-court statements offered to prove the truth of the matter 
asserted are hearsay. Utah R. Evid. 801(c) State v. McCullar, 2014 UT App 
215. 335 P.3d 900. 905 (Utah Ct. App. 2014). "Our standard of review on 
the admissibility of hearsay evidence is complex, since the determination of 
admissibility often contains a number of rulings, each of which may require 
a different standard of review. Norman H. Jackson, Utah Standards of 
Appellate Review. 12 Utah Bar J. 8, 38 (1999). We review the legal 
questions to make the determination of admissibility for correctness. Hansen 
v. Heath. 852 P.2d 977, 979 (Utah 1993). We review the questions of fact 
for clear error. State v. Parker. 2000 UT 51, ,r 13, 4 P.3d 778. Finally, we 
review the District Court's ruling on admissibility for abuse of discretion. 
Eggett v. Wasatch Energy Corp .• 2004 UT 28, ~ 10, 94 P.3d 193." State v. 
Workman, 2005 UT 66, ,r 10, 122 P.3d 639; (internal quotation marks 
omitted). Rule 105 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides: "When evidence 
which is admissible as to one party or for one purpose but not admissible as 
to another party or for another purpose is admitted, the court, upon request, 
shall restrict the evidence to its proper scope and instruct the jury 
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accordingly." Utah R. Evid. 105 In a bench trial or other proceeding in 
which the judge serves as fact finder, the court has considerable discretion to 
assign relative weight to the evidence before it. This discretion includes the 
right to minimize or even disregard certain evidence." Poll v. Poll, 2011 UT 
App 307, ~ 9, 263 P.3d 534, 537, quoting State v. Comer, 2002 UT App 
219,115, 51 P.3d 55. However, this discretion does not allow the Trial 
Court to admit evidence for one purpose and then use it for another purpose 
if the use would violate the rule against hearsay. 
At trial, Plaintiffs' Counsel made multiple objections early in the 
proceedings because of the Defendants continued elicitation of hearsay 
testimony. After one such objection, the Court and Plaintiffs' Counsel had 
the following discussion: 
THE COURT: And I will again overrule the objection, but ifwe go 
towards the truth of it, Counsel, it's going to be disregarded. 
11R. MONAHAN: In order to speed thing up I just want to, you 
know, make that a continuing objection. I understand this is a bench trial, 
the Court can give that the appropriate weight, et cetera. 
THE COURT: Thank you, Counsel. And we'll note it as a continuing 
objection for you. 
1538 pages 139-40. 
The Defendants raised no concern with the Plaintiffs request of a 
continuing objection to hearsay testimony. The parties understood that any 
evidence containing hearsay would only be used for the purpose for which it 
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was admitted under a hearsay exception. The problem in this case is that the 
Trial Court's findings clearly relied on hearsay in its findings, because no 
competent evidence is within the record that would support the Court's 
findings. 
In paragraph 32 of the Findings, the Court states: "In May 2009, 
Defendants Cuong Trang and Sylvia Trang discovered that tax filings had 
not been filed with the federal government and state." Defendant Sylvia 
Trang testified as to correspondences that she received from tax authorities. 
Plaintiffs objected to the hearsay statements. 1541 page 49. Defendants 
then sought to introduce minutes of the Corporation which contained the 
same hearsay statements. Plaintiffs objected to the minutes as containing 
hearsay statements from the tax authorities. 1541 page 50-51. There was no 
testimony or admissible evidence from any tax authority or accountant as to 
the Corporations failure to file taxes. The only statements offered to that 
effect were the testimony of Defendants Cuong Trang and Sylvia Trang 
stating that they received notices from the state and federal government 
stating that they failed to file their taxes. No notices were ever offered into 
the record. In addition, the Defendants offered, over the Plaintiffs objection, 
Exhibit D23 which the Trial Court admitted as a business record under 
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803(d). 1541 pages 51-53. That record also contained hearsay statements as 
to what the tax notices purported to state. The Trial Court used the hearsay 
statements of the purported tax notices for the truth of the matter asserted in 
the Trial Court's Findings. 
Paragraph 33 of the Findings states: "The Court finds the testimony 
credible that the Company was waiting, on the advice of their accounting 
professionals, for the Court's determination of ownership." The only 
evidence that supports that finding is Defendant Sylvia Trang's testimony 
regarding the out- of-court statements of their accountants. 1541 pages 84-
85, 1542 pages 66-68. Other than the testimony of Defendant Sylvia Trang, 
there is no competent evidence that the corporate accountants ever told the 
Defendants not to file accurate returns. The Court used this hearsay for the 
truth of the matter asserted. 
Lavina Ha and Ellen Ha never testified in this matter. Plaintiffs 
objected to out-of-court statements purportedly made by Lavinia Ha 
regarding her interest in shares. 1541 pages 38-39. Plaintiffs objected to 
documents purportedly created and signed by Lavina Ha. 1539 pages 48-50. 
Plaintiffs objected to the introduction of the Redemption Agreement. 
Plaintiffs also objected because Lavina Ha never testified to owning any 
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stock in the Corporation. 1539 pages 111-117. The Redemption Agreement 
was not a standard business record of this Corporation and should not have 
been admitted. When the out-of-court statements of Lavina Ha and the 
Redemption Agreement are struck, there is no competent evidence that 
shows that Lavina Ha owned any shares of this Corporation. 
The Trial Court was entitled to admit some of this evidence for 
purpose that it was admitted for, but the Trial Court improperly relied on this 
evidence for the truth of the matter asserted in violation of the hearsay rule. 
Paragraphs 18, 29, 32, 33 and 47 should be struck because they relied on 
out-of-court statements in violation of the hearsay rule. 
2. There was insufficient evidence to support the Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law, Order and Judgment regarding the 
distribution of shares among the shareholders. 
The parties appeared for trial only on the Plaintiffs claims regarding 
the determination of shareholders and the Plaintiffs request for a 
shareholders' meeting. The Defendants brought no claims against the 
Plaintiffs. The Defendants did not interplead or join any third parties. The 
issues before the Court were straightforward. Instead of sticking with the 
issues at hand, the Trial Court allowed the Defendants to veer into irrelevant 
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matters. On the basis of those irrelevant matters, the Trial Court then made 
unwarranted and mmecessary credibility determination. When the scope is 
limited to the issues at hand, it is clearly the Defendants' credibility that is at 
issue. It was the Defendants who presented inconsistent evidence and 
testimony. It was the Defendants who were caught fabricating evidence. On 
the most basic issue, who owned what shares, the Plaintiffs have been 
consistent throughout the litigation. Initially, the Defendants refused to 
provide any input as to who they believed owned what shares. The 
Defendants evidence and testimony has vacillated as to who owned what 
shares. Finally, when the Defendants were caught fabricating evidence, the 
Defendants explanation of their actions does not stand up because of their 
own inconsistencies. 
When challenging the district court's findings, a party must "marshal 
the evidence in support of the findings and then demonstrate that despite this 
evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking in support as to be against 
the clear weight of the evidence." Chen v. Stewart. 2004 UT 82, ,r 19, 100 
P.3d 1177 The Trial court's factual determinations are clearly erroneous 
only if they are in conflict with the clear weight of the evidence, or if this 
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court has a defmite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." 
Cummings v. Cummings. 821 P.2d 472,476 (Utah Ct.App.1991). 
A. The Plaintiffs' Stock Breakdown 
It is undisputed that the Plaintiffs have consistently asserted that they 
collectively own 80,700 shares of the 145,700 shares of the outstanding 
stock. See Exhibit P 15. The Plaintiffs have consistently relied on the IRS 
form 2553 that the parties signed at the inception of the Corporation which 
shows the stock breakdown. That document provided the breakdown of 
shares as: 
I. Cuong Si Trang - 65,000 shares; 
2. Muoi To Ha - 40,000 shares; 
3. Weiman Ha - 35,700 shares; 
4. Olivia Bae Ha - 5,000 shares; See Exhibit Pl. 
Each party acknowledged that they signed that document: 1) Cuong Si 
Trang 1538 page 110; 2) Muoi To Ha 1537 pages 48-49; 3) Weiman Ha 
1540 pages 52-53; 4) Olivia Bae Ha 1538 pages 18-19. Each of the 
Plaintiffs confirmed that it was their understanding that the stock breakdown 
as stated in IRS form 2553 was the agreement of the parties. 1537 pages 48-
49, 1538 pages 18-19, Weiman Ha 1540 pages 52-53. 
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The Plaintiffs breakdown of the stock shares was confirmed by the tax 
returns that the Defendants had prepared for the Corporation. Those returns 
also consistently show the same stock breakdown, except as percentages as 
opposed to numerical. See Exhibit D34 pages SM000169, SM000l 79, 
SM000208,SM000223,SM000239,SM000254, SM000268, SM000281, 
SM000308. The returns were filed in October and November 2009. The 
Plaintiffs had no input in their preparation. Finally, the Plaintiffs contention 
that the original stockholders was supported by the Declaration of Defendant 
Cuong Trang that was filed during summary judgment. Paragraph 3 of 
Cuong Trang's Declaration lists the original shareholders as Cuong Trang, 
Muoi Ha, Olivia Ha and Weiman Ha. Volume 2 pages 790-92. 1541 pages 
142-47. 
The Plaintiffs' statements on stock ownership has been consistent. 
The Plaintiffs proposition of the ownership of stock is supported by the 
Defendants own Exhibits and Declarations. 
B. Defendants' Stock Breakdown 
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The Defendants assertion of the stock breakdown has not been 
consistent3• The Defendants' initial responses to the Plaintiffs' requests for 
a shareholder meeting were devoid of any assertions as to the shareholders. 
See P14 and P18. The Defendants reaction was to demand that the Plaintiffs 
produce stock certificates. The Defendants knew that this was impossible 
because at trial, the Defendants admitted that no stock certificates had ever 
been issued. 4 
Defendant Cuong Trang testified that the original shareholders were 
Cuong Trang, Lavina Ha, Olivia Ha and Muoi Ha. 1538 page 34 Exhibit 
DS. The Corporate records show that the Corporation was initially 
authorized to issue 145,700 shares. Defendant Cuong Trang testified that 
Lavina Ha owned 20,000 shares; Olivia Ha owned 5,000 shares, Muoi Ha 
owned 40,000 shares and Cuong Trang owned 65,000 shares. 1539 page 35. 
That is a total of 130,000 shares not 145,700 as authorized. Defendant 
3 Paragraph 16 of the Trial Court's Findings state that Lavina Ha was 
initially given 35,700 shares. Plaintiffs cannot find any evidence in the 
record where the Defendants assert that Lavina Ha owned 35,700 shares. 
4 During the October 3 trial date, Sylvia Trang asserted that she saw actual 
physical stock certificates 1541 page 176-77. Previously during the August 
7 proceeding, Cuong Trang admitted that no physical stock certificates had 
been issued., 1539 page 37, however later he also indicated that physical 
stock certificates had been issued, 1539 page 139, Defendants' Counsel 
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Cuong Trang testified that Lavina Ha gave Weiman Ha 15,700 of her shares. 
1539 page 36. Defendant Cuong Trang then testified somewhat 
inconsistently that Lavina Ha owned 35,700 shares. Defendant Cuong 
Trang presented a revocable proxy that showed that Lavina Ha owned 4,215 
shares at the Corporations inception. Exhibit D 11. Defendant Cuong Trang 
could not explain why Lavina Ha signed a proxy for 4,215 shares when she 
purportedly owned 20,000 shares. 1539 page 139. Later Lavina Ha signed a 
revocation of proxy for 4,390 shares. Exhibit D11. Throughout this 
litigation, the Defendants offered no solid declaration as to the stock 
ownership of this Corporation. The Defendants have offered no solid 
explanation as to why they have varied the stock amounts. The Defendants 
proposition on stock ownership is not worthy of belief. 
C. Fabrications and Inconsistencies 
The Defendants provided the Court with a litany of inconsistencies 
along with an admission of an outright fabrication of documents. Although 
inconsistencies may be explained away by lapses in memory, the Defendants 
have no excuses for fabricating documents and filing them with the Court 
without any acknowledgment of the fabrication. 
subsequently stipulated that no physical certificates had been issued. 1539 
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During trial, the Defendants provided the Plaintiffs with the 
documents that would become Exhibits D6 and D 11. The documents are 
purportedly signed by Lavina Ha. Exhibit D6 indicates that it was signed by 
Lavina Ha on March 23, 1999. Exhibit D 11 indicates that it was signed by 
Lavina Ha on December 10, 2004. On August 7, 2013, the Defendants 
introduced the Exhibits D6 and DI 1. 1539 pages 37 and 48. Defendants' 
Counsel had Cuong Trang authenticate the documents as documents created 
by and signed by Lavina Ha. 1539 pages 37-39 and 48-50. Defendant's 
Counsel sought the admission of the documents, over the objection of the 
Plaintiffs, as documents kept in the regular and ordinary course of business. 
1539 pages 38-39 and 49. The next day, Plaintiffs' Counsel notified the 
Court that Exhibits D6 and D11 were likely fabrications. 1540 page 4. 
Defendants' Counsel then indicated that he was aware that these documents 
were not originals. He went on further to indicate that the originals had been 
found. 1540 page 5. Defendant Cuong Trang then testified that he had 
found the originals in 2010 after they entered Weiman Ha's office. 1540 
pages 24-25. Defendant Sylvia Trang testified that they entered Weiman 
Ha's office and obtained the records on July 1, 2009. 1541 pages 63-65 
page 141-42. 
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Exhibit D 23 page SM000049. Sylvia Trang testified that the Defendants 
never found the originals ofD6 or DI 1. 1541 page 136. 
Defendant Sylvia Trang admitted that she created these documents in 
March, 20 IO and e-mailed them to Lavina Ha with a request that Lavina Ha 
sign and return them to her. 1542 pages 55, 1540 page 129-35. Defendant 
Sylvia Trang explained that she could not locate the originals of these 
documents however she was able to locate the original computer generated 
documents because it was located at her home in Utah. She also stated that 
the old computer generated documents could not be e-mailed or printed or 
otherwise transferred from the computer that they were on. Therefore, she 
recreated the documents on a different computer, line by line, and then sent 
the recreated documents to Lavina Ha. Sylvia Trang testified that Ellen Ha 
originally created these documents. 1541 pages 129-30. Sylvia Trang then 
disposed of the old computer by donating it to DI later that year. 1541 page 
131. Defendant Sylvia Trang's testimony was contradicted by Defendant 
Cuong Trang who stated that Lavina Ha originally created these documents 
and mailed them from California. Sylvia Trang could not have recreated 
these documents from an old computer in her home because they were 
created by Lavina Ha in Calif omia. 
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Ultimately, the Defendants story regarding the creation of these 
documents does not hold water. There is no logical reason as to why these 
documents needed to be created in March, 2010 except as a direct response 
to Weiman Ha's request for a shareholder's meeting. Because these 
documents are clearly fabrications created to thwart the Plaintiffs request for 
a meeting, it raises the question of the authenticity of all of the documents 
offered by the Defendants. Throughout this dispute, the Defendants have 
repeatedly claimed, without a shred of proof, that Weiman Ha took any 
corporate records. The Defendants acknowledged that they obtained access 
to the room used by Weiman Ha in July, 2009. When Weiman Ha twice 
requested shareholders meetings, he was rebuffed by claims that he stole 
corporate records. Yet it appears that the only records that Weiman Ha left 
behind were those records most detrimental to his case. In addition, 
Defendant Cuong Trang testified that they found the corporate minute books 
in Weiman Ha's room somewhere around March 19, 2010. Again this was 
contradicted by Sylvia Trang's testimony that they entered and obtained the 
records in the room on July 1, 2009. The Defendants demand that Weiman 
Ha return the corporate records was a smoke screen, like their demands that 
the Plaintiffs produce non-existent stock certificate. The Plaintiffs, unlike 
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the Defendants, were not accustomed to creating fictitious documents out of 
thin air and therefore had no corporate records or stock certificates to 
produce. 
There were further inconsistencies in the Defendants' evidence. In an 
effort to undermine the legitimacy of Exhibit Pl, the Defendants sought to 
questions its validity. Sylvia Trang testified that she was present in the back 
office of the Southeast Supermarket when Exhibit Pl was completed by 
Ellen Ha and Weiman Ha. 1541 page 123. However, in order to provide 
authenticity to Exhibit D6 Sylvia Trang testified that she was living in 
California with Lavina Ha, Muio Ha, and Ellen Ha and she watched Lavina 
Ha sign the proxy marked as Exhibit D6 on March 23, 1999. 1539 page 
127. The Defendants testified that Weiman Ha was removed as a Director 
on December 10, 2004. Cuong Trang testified that Weiman Ha could no 
longer sign checks after that date. The Defendants' own Exhibit D3 4 shows 
checks written by Weiman Ha after December 10, 2004. Weiman Ha 
remained a Director according to the State of Utah until he was removed by 
Defendant Sylvia Trang on March 8, 2010, shortly after he requested a 
meeting of Directors. 
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The Trial Court's factual determinations were against the clear weight 
of the evidence. The Trial Court abused its discretion when it made 
credibility determinations on irrelevant matters. The competent evidence 
showed that the parties owned the following shares Cuong Si Trang - 65,000 
shares; Olivia Bae Ha - 5,000 shares; Weiman Ha - 35,700 shares; Muoi To 
Ha - 40,000 shares. This Court should recognize the plain evidence that was 
before the Trial Court. This Court should reverse the decision of the Trial 
Court and detennine the shares of the parties as proposed by the Plaintiffs. 
3. Cuong Trang was not entitled to assert the interests of 
Lavina Ha 
One of the biggest problems that the Plaintiffs had was arguing 
against an empty chair. Throughout these proceedings the Defendants have 
repeatedly claimed that they could not hold a shareholders meeting because 
they were uncertain of the makeup of the shareholders. The Defendants 
claimed that they intended to amend the tax returns that supported the 
Plaintiffs' case but had to wait until the Court determined the actual share 
percentages. Despite this complete uncertainty as to shareholders, 
Defendant Cuong Trang and his attorneys were confident enough as to the 
shareholders that they paid Lavina Ha $138,000 for her purported shares. 
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See Exhibit D19 section 2.4. Even the Redemption Agreement 
acknowledges that these shares were disputed. Exhibit D 19 Recital E. 
Plaintiffs objected to the Defendants' claim of Lavina Ha's interest 
because the Defendants never made her a party under Rule 14, U.R.C.P. 
Rule 14, U.R.C.P. provides: "At any time after commencement of the action 
a defendant, as a third party plaintiff may cause a summons and complaint to 
be served on a person not a party to the action who is or may be liable to him 
of all or part of the Plaintiffs claim against him." The Defendants were 
officers of the Cmporation. Defendant Cuong Trang was a Director of the 
Corporation. The Defendants had a fiduciary duty to protect the interests of 
all of the shareholders of the Corporation. The Defendants knew that any 
stock claimed by Lavina Ha would be negatively impacted by an adverse 
decision against the Defendants. As fiduciaries to Lavina Ha they would _be 
liable to her for not protecting her interest. "A third-party claim may be 
asserted under Rule 14(a) only when the third-party's liability is in some way 
dependent on the outcome of the main claim or when the third-party is 
secondarily liable to defendant."). Amica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler. 768 P.2d 
950, 960 (Utah Ct.App.), Hughes v. Housley. 599 P.2d 1250, 1253 {Utah 
1979). 
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The Plaintiffs never brought Lavina Ha into this action because the 
Plaintiffs have consistently asserted that she has no interest in this 
I 
Corporation. The Defendants, if they believed that she had an interest in the 
Corporation, had an obligation under Rule 14 to bring her into this action. 
Because they failed to bring Lavina Ha into this action, the Trial Court 
should have denied the Defendants any right to assert the interests of Lavina 
Ha. Without any claims by Lavina Ha, the only reasonable division of the 
existing shares was the one proposed by the Plaintiffs: Cuong Si Trang -
65,000 shares; Olivia Bae Ha - 5,000 shares; Weiman Ha - 35,700 shares; 
Muoi To Ha - 40,000 shares. This Court should reverse the decision of the 
Trial Court and determine the shares of the parties as proposed by the 
Plaintiffs. 
4. Plaintiffs Demand for a Special Shareholders Meeting was 
Proper 
On April 11, 2011, the Plaintiffs, Weiman Ha, Muoi Ha and Olivia Ha 
sent certified letters to Defendants Cuong Trang and Sylvia Ha demanding 
that a special shareholder's meeting be called. Exhibit PIS. The Trial Court 
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determined that Plaintiffs' request for a special shareholders' meeting was 
improper because the request was signed by the Plaintiffs' attorney instead 
of by the individual shareholders. The Plaintiffs request for a special 
shareholders meeting was appropriate. 
Utah courts have long recognized that a client may be bound by the 
actions of their attorney when the attorney is acting within the confines of 
their authority. See generally, Bivans v. Utah Lake Land. Water & Power 
Co., 53 Utah 601, 607, 174 P. 1132, 1128 (1918). Also under Utah law, the 
knowledge of an agent concerning the business which he is transacting for 
his principal is to be imputed to his principal. Mi Vida Enterprises v. Steen-
Adams, 122 P.3d 144, 148 (UT Ct. App. 20051. It is illogical that the 
Plaintiffs are bound by the actions of their attorney that they have retained, 
but that their attorney lacks authority to act on their behalf. 
The Court should reverse the Trial Court's finding that the Plaintiffs 
request for a special shareholders' meeting was deficient. The Court should 
order a special shareholders' meeting based on the division of shares as 
proposed by the Plaintiffs. 
5. Mediation Costs Should Not Have Been Awarded 
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On November 13, 2013, the Defendants filed a Memorandum of 
Costs. Defendant's memorandum requested costs associated with the parties 
failed mediation. On November 19, 2013, Plaintiffs filed an objection to 
costs. On March 6, 2014, the Trial Court issued a Memorandum Decision 
on Costs, and Plaintiffs' Motion for Clarification and Stay. The 
Memorandum decision awarded the Defendants costs associated with the 
mediation. 
Rule 54( d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states that "costs shall 
be allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise 
directs." Utah R. Civ. P. 54(d)(l). Utah courts have consistently made "a 
distinction between 'legitimate and taxable "costs" and other "expenses" of 
litigation which may be ever so necessary, but are not taxable as costs."' 
Morgan v. Morgan. 795 P.2d 684, 687 (Utah Ct.App.1990) (quoting 
Frampton v. Wilson, 605 P.2d 771, 774 (Utah 1980)). Utah courts recognize 
that there is a difference between the costs allowed under Rule 54(d) and 
those permitted by contract. Dale K. Barker Co. v. John K. Bushnell, 2010 
UT App 189,237 P.3d 903, cert. denied, 245 P.3d 757 (2010) see also 
Stevensen 3rd E., LC v. Watts, 2009 UT App 137, ,r 63,210 P.3d 977. 
Under Rule 54( d), Utah Courts define costs as witness fees, travel expenses, 
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and service of process expenses, but "only in accordance with the fee 
schedule set by statute." Morgan, 795 P.2d at 686-87. Trial courts abuse 
their discretion when they award costs outside of these limitations. Long v. 
Stutesman, 2011 UT App 438,269 P.3d 178 (Utah Ct. App. 201 I). The 
Trial Court abused its discretion when it awarded the Defendants costs 
associated with the mediation. The mediation costs requested by the 
Defendants are not permitted under Rule 54( d). 
CONCLUSION 
The Trial Court improperly relied on hearsay statements for its 
Findings of Fact. The Court of Appeals should strike those Findings. The 
Trial Court improperly allowed the Defendants to assert the interests of a 
third party who was not a party to this action. The Trial Court improperly 
allowed irrelevant issues to cloud the issues before the Court. The clear 
weight of the evidence supported the Plaintiffs request for the share division. 
The Court of Appeals should reverse the decision of the Trial Court on the 
division of the shares. The shares of the Corporation should be determined 
as follows: Cuong Si Trang - 65,000 shares; Olivia Bae Ha - 5,000 shares; 
Weiman Ha - 35,700 shares; Muoi To Ha - 40,000 shares. The Trial Court 
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improperly awarded the Defendants costs associated with mediation. This 
Court should strike that award. 
Dated: Wednesday, December 10, 2014. 
~?MON 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
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ADDENDUM 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
NOV O 't 2013 
Salt Lake County -r--J 
By: 'L __________ .:,.=:,__ 
Deputy Clerk 
WEIMAN HA, et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW, ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
vs. 
CUONG SI TRANG, et al., 
Defendants. 
Case No. 110913027 
Judge Su .J. Chon 
A bench trial commenced in this matter on Monday, August 5, 2013 and continued 
through August 6, 7 and 8, 2013 and September 3, 4, and 5, 2013. Plaintiffs Weiman Ha, Muoi 
Ha and Olivia Ha (collectively, "Plaintiffs") were represented by Russell T. Monahan of Cook & 
Monahan, P.C. Defendants Cuong Si Trang, Sylvia Trang and Southeast Supermarket, Inc. 
(collectively, "Defendants"), were represented by Michael P. Petrogeorge and Nicole G. Farrell 
of Parsons Behle & Latimer, P.C. 
After considering all of the evidence presented at trial and hearing the arguments of 
counsel, the Court hereby enters its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. In 1997, Cuong Trang ("Cuong") decided to quit his job as an engineer and 
purchase an Asian food market known as "Tay Do." 
2. Cuong acquired the market using his own savin_gs and additional money from his 
uncle in July 1997. 
3. Cuong renamed the market ''New Tay Do" and operated the market as a sole 
proprietorship. 
4. At some point in 1997, Cuong's wife, Pamela Trang ("Pamela") informed her 
siblings and Cuong's in-laws, including Weiman Ha ("Weiman"), Muoi Ha ("Muoi") and Olivia 
Ha ("Olivia"), regarding the acquisition of the market. 
5. Muoi and Olivia came to Salt Lake City in 1997 to count inventory at the market 
with respect to the purchase. Muoi and Olivia were Canadian residents at that time and traveled 
to Salt Lake City from time to time to assist with the market. 
6. At some point in 1997 or 1998, Weiman was brought in to help the market 
because of his general business experience. He did not have experience in running a market. 
7. At some point in 1997, both Muoi and Olivia contributed funds to Cuong for the 
market. Muoi contributed a total of forty thous~d dollars ($40,000.00), and Olivia contributed 
five thousand dollars ($5,000.00). 
8. Weiman did not contribute any money to the market, and the Court did not fmd 
Weiman's testimony credible. He was unable to testify how much money he contributed and 
when he made any contributions, wtlike the other Plaintiffs. Weiman' s testimony throughout the 
trial was also contradictory in other areas. For example, he testified that both he and Cuong were 
responsible for incorporation but he did not know whose handwriting was on certain 
incorporation documents. Given his lack of English speaking ability, he would have been unable 
2 
to create any of these documents. His testimony on checks written by him on the Company's 
account for personal expenses was also not credible. 
9. Lavinina Ha ("Lavinia"), another in-law, contributed twenty thousand dollars 
($20,000.00) to the market. 
10. In 1999, Cuong and Weiman decided to incorporate the business. The decision 
was made to rename the market "Southeast Supennarket." Its principal place of business is 422 
East 900 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111. 
I 1. Weiman's daughter, Ellen Ha ("Ellen"), an accountant living in California, was 
asked to assist Cuong and Weiman in fonning the corporate entity to operate the business. Ellen 
assisted in the preparation of Articles of Incorporation and Corporate Bylaws and other 
documents for Southeast Supermarket, Inc. (the "Company"), Although Weiman.claimed that he 
and C~ong prepared the documents, the Court does not find that credible. Sylvia Trang 
("Sylvia") testified that she lived with Ellen and saw her preparing the incorporation documents. 
12. The Company was officially fonned on March 24, 1999 as a C corporation. The 
Articles of Incorporation for the Company identify both Cuong and Weiman as directors of the 
Company. 
13. Both Cuong and Weiman were aware of their assigned role as Directors of the 
Company, and both agreed to serve in that capacity. 
14. The Articles of Incorporation for the Company authorize the issuance of 145,700 
shares of stock. 
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15. Plaintiffs attempted to establish the allocation of shares by use of the Election of S 
ColJloration, Form 2553 (the "Election Fonn''). The Court does not find that this document is 
evidence of the proper allocation of shares in the Company. The Election Fonn dated on March 
24, 1999 was prepared in handwriting by someone other than Cuong, Weiman, Muoi and Olivia. 
Those four parties testified that the Electiop Form was not prepared in their own handwriting. 
This follll showed a different allocation of shares and was originally signed by the parties. This 
document was never filed with the IRS. Sylvia testified that while she was living with Ellen, 
Ellen prepared this fonn at Weiman's direction. In November 2006, Ellen found the Election 
Form in her files when she moved to Washington and mailed itto Sylvia. 
16. On or before March 24, 1999, it was initially deter:mined that shares in the 
Company would be issued as follows: Cuong: 65,000; Muoi: 40,000; Lavinia: 35,700; Olivia: 
5,000. Lavinia later determined however, that she wanted 15,700 of her anticipated shares to be 
issued to her brother, Weiman, in recognition of the work he had been doing at the market. It 
was therefore agreed that the shares of the Company would be issued as follows: Cuong: 
65,000; Muoi: 40,000; Lavinia: 20,000; Weiman: 15,700; Olivia: 5,000. 
17. No share certificates were issued. 
18. On March 23, 1999, Lavinia, who lived and worked in California, executed a 
proxy authorizing her brother, Weiman> to vote her shares in the Company in her absence. 
Unlike the other Ha family members, Lavinia was not involved in the day-to-day rwming of the 
market. Sylvia testified that she was also living with Lavinia at the time, and Lavinia showed 
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her the document and explained it to her. Cuong also testified that he received the signed proxy 
mailed from Lavinia arowid that time. 
19. Copies of the Company's Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws were provided to 
Cuong and Weiman, on or around March 24, 1999. Copies of the Articles and Bylaws were later 
found in a room strictly under Weiman' s possession and control, proving he had received them. 
20. There is no additional evidence that Muoi and Olivia received these docmnents. 
Muoi and Olivia also were not involved in the formation of the Company. 
21. On March 26, 1999, the Company's bylaws were amended to correct an internal 
numbering error. No substantive revisions were made. 
22. The Company's Bylaws provide that shares in the Company cannot be sold 
outside the Company. The Company Bylaws further provide that any transfer of shares must be 
approved by the President and Secretary of the Company, and that the transaction must occur in 
the physical presence of the President and Secretary of the Company as well as the Company's 
legal counsel. 
23. Weiman, Muoi and Olivia each worked as employees of the Company. Weiman 
had general responsibility for the financial affairs of the Company, had access to and signature 
authority on the Company's bank accounts, and was responsible for tax filings, including sales 
and income tax filings. Weiman also had control of the company records. Muoi and Olivia 
worked as sales clerks and assisted in the ordering of inventory. 
24. Cuong also worked in the supennarket and worked in banking, inventory, 
stocking, preparation of certain food products, and administrative and corporate matters. Cuong 
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:frequently called upon his children to help at the market and to ensure that all of the work could 
be done. 
25. The Company was a family run corporation. The Company did not follow 
corporate procedures all the time, and it was run loosely by Weiman, Cuong, Muoi and Olivia 
during this period. 
26. In 2004, Weiman Ha opened a restaurant next to the market. 
27. In 2004, Weiman Ha suffered a stroke which temporarily paralyzed him on his 
left side. After his stroke, Weiman Ha returned to work at the market but worked less hours. 
28. In late December 2004, it was discovered that Weiman had been writing checks 
on the Company accounts in order to pay for rent for the separate restaurant, South China House, 
which he had opened next door, to pay for equipment and upgrades for the restaurant, and to pay 
for personal expenses, including medical expenses associated with a stroke. As a result of this 
discovery, Cuong removed Weiman as Director and revoked his signatw-e authority on the 
Company's accounts. 
29. Around this same time, Lavinia revoked the proxy she had given to Weiman to 
vote her shares in the Company. The proxy revocation was mailed to and received by Cuong. 
30. In 2007, it was determined that Muoi was talcing money from the Company. 
Muoi testified that she had not taken money from the Company, but video evidence showed that 
she had engaged in ta.Icing money surreptitiously from the cash register. As a result of this 
discovery, Muoi' s employment with the company was terminated. The Court does not find her 
testimony to be credible. 
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31. On November 6, 2007, Muoi entered into a Stock Purchase Agreement purporting 
to transfer her 40,000 shares in the Company to her brother, Weiman, for $57,000. Weiman 
never paid Muoi any money for the shares. The Stock Purchase Agreement was never approved 
by Cuong, as the Company President, and the transfer did not occur in the presence of Cuong, as 
the Company President, or in the presence of the Company's legal counsel. However, the Court 
finds that Muoi was not aware of the share transfer restriction, and she is still the owner of the 
40,000 shares. 
32. In May 2009, Cuong and Sylvia discovered that the tax filings had not been filed 
with the federal government and state. 
33. The Company later filed several tax returns based on the incomplete corporate 
records, including the Election fonn, and incorrectly stated the stock shareholders in the 
Company. The Court finds the testimony credible that the Company was waiting, on the advice 
of their accounting professionals, for the Court's detennination of ownership. 
34. Cuong and Sylvia consistently asked Weiman for the tax records. He would 
provide them some of the documents from his restaurant, piecemeal or a box at a time, but the 
records were not complete. Cuong and Sylvia also discovered that the corporate records were 
missing. 
35. Weiman had an office at the Company that he had sole control over and the only 
key. He testified that he had not given them the key and had thrown it away. 
36. In 2009, Sylvia hired a locksmith to open the office door. Inside the office was a 
bed, a desk, a shrine to Weiman' s mother, and cookware for making food. Also inside were 
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numerous corporate documents strewn throughout the office, including the Articles of 
Incorporation and Bylaws. 
3 7. These documents were still not complete. Weiman failed to provide them with 
any other tax docwnents. The co.tporate records were also incomplete. Sylvia went through old 
computers at the family home and found several old corporate docwnents. Because of the age of 
the computers and the software, she was unable to transfer documents to the new computers. 
She therefore recreated these documents word for word, including the docwnents from Lavinia 
regarding her shares. 
38. Both Cuong and Sylvia testified that Lavinia had initially signed several 
documents regarding her shares. Weiman had the corporate documents in his possession when 
these documents went missing. Lavinia signed several documents indicating that was the owner 
of 20,000 shares, contributed $20,000, revoked the stock proxy, and eventually sold her shares 
back to the Company. 
39. On November 14, 2009, Sylvia became the Secretary and Treasurer of the 
Company. Cuong continued to serve as the Company's President and CEO. Cuong's son, 
Thanh Trang, became the Company's Chief Marketing Officer and Chief Operating Officer. 
40. On February 26, 2010, Weiman sent a letter to the Company, Attn: Cuong, 
demanding that a special shareholders meeting be held on March 12, 2010 at 2:00 p.m. at the · 
corporate offices of the Company (the "February 2010 Demand"). This meeting was never held 
because he had not addressed the letter to the secretary of the corporation. 
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41. In March 2010, Weiman was removed as a director from the State of Utah's 
records, but the Court does not find that this is evidence that he was retained as a director since 
2004. Sylvia's testimony that the online reporting allowed them to update the records of 
directors and officers online for the first time was credible. 
42. On April 18, 2010, Cuong, Lavinia, Weiman and Olivia met .at the South China 
House Restaurant to discuss business and shareholders' concerns at Lavinia's request. The Court 
fmds that this supports Defendant's claims that Lavinia was a shareholder. 
43. The Company attempted to hold a special shareholders meeting on April 19, 
2010, and sent out notice. Cuong was the only shareholder in attendance and thus no business 
was conducted. 
44. In 2011, there was a dispute regarding Olivia's activities at the supermarket, and 
as a result, Olivia's employment with the Company was tenninated. 
45. Since Olivia's termination in 2011, the supermarket has been operated entirely by 
Cuong and his children, including Sylvia and Thanh, and non-family employees. Plaintiffs have 
had no further involvement in the operation of the Company. 
46. On April 11, 2011, counsel for Plaintiffs sent the Company, Attn: Cuong and 
Sylvia, a letter demanding that a special shareholders meeting be convened at the corporate 
· offices of the Company no later than July l, 2011 (the "April 2011 Demand"). This letter was 
not signed by the Plaintiffs as required by the Bylaws so the meeting was never held. 
47. On July 17, 2013, Lavinia entered into a Stock Interest Redemption Agreement 
pursuant to which the Company agreed to redeem her 20,000 shares for $138,000. 
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48. Cuong currently has no other business or employment besides the Company. 
49. Weiman continues to own and operate his restaurant, South China House. 
50, Defendants and Plaintiffs dispute the ownership of the Company. Defendants 
assert that Cuong owns the majority of shares in the Company, whereas Plaintiffs assert that 
they, collectively, have a majority interest in the Company. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Based on the foregoing findings of fact, the Court makes the following Conclusions of 
Law: 
1. On or around March 24, 1999, the Company had 145,700 issued and outstanding 
shares, with Cuong holding 65,000 (or 44.6%)1 of the issued and outstanding shares, Muoi 
holding 40,000 (or 27.5%)2 of the issued and outstanding shares, Lavinia holding 20,000 (or 
13.7%) of the issued ~d outstanding shares, Weiman holding 15,700 (or 10.8%)3 of the issued 
and outstanding shares, and Olivia holding 5,000 (or 3.4%)4 of the issued and outstanding shares. 
2. The Stock Purchase Agreement pursuant to which Muoi attempted to transfer her 
shares in the Company to Weiman violated the express provisions of the Company's Bylaws. 
Although Weiman is charged with notice of the restrictions, Muoi did not have notice of the 
restrictions and therefore, Muoi retains the 40,000 shares. 
1 All percentages are approximate, 
2 AU percentages are approximate. 
3 All percentages are approximate. 
~ AIJ percentages are approximate. 
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3. The total number of issued and outstanding shares, and the percentages of 
ownership, did not change until July 17, 2013. 
4. As a result of the Shareholder Interest Redemption Agreement entered into by and 
between Lavinia and the Company on July 17, 2013, Lavinia's 20,000 shares were redeemed by 
the Company for $138,000. Lavinia no longer has any interest in the Company. 
5. As of July 17, 2013, the total issued and outstanding shares in the company was 
reduced to 125,700, with Cuong holding 65,000 (or 51.71%)5 of the i~sued and outstanding 
shares, Muoi holding 40,000 (or 31.82%)6 of the issued and outstanding shares, Weiman holding 
15,700 (or 12.49%)7 of the issued and outstanding shares, and Olivia holding 5,000 (or 3.97%)8 
of the issued and outstanding shares. 
6. Although Utah law requires a company to hold annual shareholder :meetings, 
Defendants have been justified in their failure to call and conduct such meetings over the past 
few years because there has been an ongoing dispute regarding the ownership of the shares in the 
Company. 
7. To constitute a proper demand for a special shareholder's meeting, the demand 
must be signed and dated by a shareholder holding a ten percent (10%) interest in the company, 
and must be delivered and addressed to the company's secretary. See Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-
702(I)(b). Utah law does not allow the shareholder demanding the meeting to fix the date, time 
5 All percentages are approximate. 
6 All percentages are approximate. 
7 All percentages are approximate. 
8 All percentages are approximate. 
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and place for the meeting, but leaves such matters to the discretion of the Company and its Board 
of Directors. See Utah Code Ann. § 16-1 Oa-702. 
8. The February 2010 Demand did not comply with Utah law because it was not 
addressed to the Company's secretary, and because it purported to fix the date, time and place for 
the meeting. Alternatively, Defendants were justified in refusing to call the requested special 
meeting because there was a dispute regarding the ownership of the shares in the Company. 
9. The April 2011 Demand did not comply with Utah law because it was signed and 
sent by Plaintiffs' counsel, and was not signed and dated by any of the shareholders in the 
company. 
· ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, and for good cause 
appearing therefore, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. There are currently 125,700 issued and outstanding shares in the Company, with 
Cuong owning 65,000 (or 51.71%) of those issued and outstanding shares, Muoi owning 40,000 
(or 31.82%) of those issued and outstanding shares, Weiman owning 15,700 (or 12.49%) of 
those issued and outstanding shares, and Olivia owning 5,000 (or 3.97%) of those issued and 
outstanding shares. 
2. Lavinia is no longer a shareholder in the Company, all of her shares having been 
redeemed by the Company on July 17, 2013. 
3. An annual meeting of the Company's shareholders shall be called by Defendants, 
and such meeting shall be held within the next seventy-five (75) days. The date, time, location 
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and agenda for this meeting shall be detennined and established by Defendants, and the meeting 
shall be noticed by Sylvia} as the Company's secretary, in accordance with the requirements of 
Utah law. Votes at the meeting shall be taken in accordance with the shareholder percentages set 
forth in paragraph 1, above, 
4. No special shareholders meeting need be called by Defendants at this time. 
5. The record date for the purpose of notice and fixing the shares eligible to 
participate is September 5, 2013. 
6. The quorum of shareholders will be consistent with the Corporate Bylaws 
Ad.mended [sic] March 26, 1999, paragraph 5. 
DATED this 4th day ofNovember, 2013. 
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NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Civil No. 110913027 
Judge SU CHON 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the Plaintiffs, Weiman Ha, Muoi Ha and Olivia Ha 
hereby appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals the final Judgment entered in this matter on 
November 4, 2013, by the Honorable Su Chon. The Appeal is taken from the Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law, Order and Judgment. 
DATED: Monday, December 2, 2013. 
Isl Russell T. Monahan 
RUSSELL T. MONAHAN 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WEIMAN HA, et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CUONG SI TRANG, et al., 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
REGARDING DEFENDANTS' 
MEMORANDUM OF COSTS, AND 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR 
CLARIFICATION AND STAY 
Case No. 110913027 
Judge Su J. Chon 
This matter is before the Court on the Plaintiffs' Motion for Stay, Plaintiffs' Motion 
for Clarification, and Defendants' Motion for Costs. The motions were fully briefed and 
noticed for submission on January 14 and February 4, 2014. The motions are ready for 
decision. 
Memorandum of Costs 
Defendants filed seven types of costs that it believes should be awarded to them 
as the successful parties at trial. Those costs were ( 1) the fee for the interpreter for 
Defendants' initial consultation with Defendant Cuong Trang; (2) mediation fee for 
August 9, 2012; (3) mediation fee for July 26, 2013; (3) DVD copy charges; (4) fees for 
exhibit binders for use at trial; (5) fees for trial transcripts; (6) translation fee of the audio 
tape for April 18, 201 0; and (7) parking fees at the Courthouse. 
Rule 54(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a prevailing party 
shall be awarded taxable costs. Generally, the courts have distinguished legitimate 
taxable costs from other expenses of litigation that may be necessary but are not 
taxable. See Frampton v. Wilson, 605 P.2d 771, 774 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). Generally, 
those costs are court costs, service of process fees, and witness fees. The courts have 
also allowed mediation fees and deposition costs. "When no statute governs a 
particular item of expense, the allowance or disallowance of a particular item as a cost 
falls within the sound discretion of th_e trial court." Stevenett v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 
977 P.2d 508 (Utah Ct. App. 1999); see a/so, Frampton, 605 P.2d at 773-774. The 
courts are allowed some discretion to award costs but those costs must be reasonable 
and necessary. 
Of those seven costs, the fees for interpreter for Defendants' initial consultation, 
the DVD copy charges, fees for exhibit binders; trial transcript fees, parking fees, and 
translation fee for the audio tape of the April 18th meeting are not permissible costs to 
be taxed to the Plaintiffs. Defendants did not provide any basis for which these fees 
could be awarded under Utah law. With respect to the mediation fees, those costs 
appear to be reasonable and permissible under Utah law. See Stevenett, 97 5 P .2d at 
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516-517. Plaintiffs did not make any objection as to the mediation fees, and they shall 
be awarded. The total costs awarded to Defendants are $1,072.50. 
Motion for Clarification 
On November 4, 2013 the Court entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law. The Plaintiffs have appealed that decision to the Utah Court of Appeals. The 
appellate court requested an affirmation that the Findings and Conclusions constitute a 
final, appealable decision. The Plaintiffs move this Court to clarify. Because the 
November 4 decision disposed of all remaining clauses of action, the Court affirms that 
along with the award of costs herein, the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Order are a final judgment and is certified pursuant to Rule 54, U.R.C.P. 
Motion to Stay Proceedings 
The Plaintiffs also move the Court to stay its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law pending appeal, in particular, the Order and Judgment requiring the holding of a 
shareholders' meeting. The Court ordered: 
An annual meeting of the Company's shareholders shall be called by 
Defendants, and such meeting shall be held within the next seventy-five 
(75) days. The date, time, location and agenda for this meeting shall be 
determined and established by Defendants, and the meeting shall be 
noticed by Sylvia, as the Company's secretary, in accordance with the 
requirements of Utah law. Votes at the meeting shall be taken in 
accordance with the shareholder percentages set forth in paragraph 1, 
above. 
The Plaintiffs seek a stay of the shareholder's meeting. The Defendants respond 
that the motion is moot because the shareholders' meeting was held on January 17 
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(within 75 days as ordered by the Court). The majority of shareholders attended the 
meeting and elected officers. The parties debate whether the meeting was valid 
because notice of the meeting was sent on January 3, which is not at least 20 days' 
notice as required in the Corporation Bylaws but which is at least 10 days' notice under 
Utah Code section 16-10a-705(1). Because the Court's order referenced the 
requirements of Utah Jaw, the Court finds the Defendants' argument more compelling in 
that the notice period is 10 rather than 20 days, and as such, the meeting was valid. 
The Court also notes that the Plaintiffs appear to have received prior notice of the 
meeting but opted not to attend. The Plaintiffs' Motion to Stay is denied as moot. 
For the forgoing reasons, the Court denies Plaintiffs' Motion to Stay, grants 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Clarification, and denies Defendants' Motion for Costs. This is the 
order of the Court and no further order is necessary. 
DATED this 6th day of March, 2014. 
JUDGE 
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